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Abstract 
What determines the failure of local government amalgamation referenda? 
Existing research suggests that functional pressures act as a push factor towards 
local territorial reform, whereas considerations of political self-determination 
exert a pull effect. However, we know little about the respective importance of 
these countervailing forces. In this paper, I analyze popular vote decisions on 
mergers of 541 municipalities involved in 166 different merger projects in three 
Swiss cantons since the new millennium. The results show that both functional 
pressures and concerns for self-determination are linked to popular vote 
outcomes: small municipalities are less likely to reject a merger. Concerns for 
self-determination matter, but only when the pressures of smallness are not 
overwhelming: a higher vote share of right-wing parties and a preponderance of 
other municipalities in the merger coalition increase the probability that voters 
reject a merger project. This has implications for policy-makers' strategies when 
drafting and promoting voluntary local amalgamation reforms. 
 
1. Introduction 
Local government mergers always lead to the dissolution of at least one 
municipality and to the alteration of at least two of them. This redrawing of local 
boundaries can face considerable opposition from affected constituencies. In most 
countries this resistance remains toothless, however, because local government mergers 
are implemented top-down by higher government tiers (e.g. in Denmark, Germany, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom) (Baldersheim and Rose 2010a). For this reason, we 
know rather little about when these reforms are contested by local constituencies and the 
reasons why they reject local government merger projects (but see Hanes, Wikström and 
Wångmar 2012). 
A viable starting point to answer this question is the postfunctionalist theory of 
governance. In a nutshell, it states that territorial reforms are triggered by functional 
pressures for efficient governance but that they are met with resistance when they 
concern a community’s desire for self-determination: when functional pressures and 
concerns for self-determination collide, the latter will be stronger according to this theory 
(Hooghe and Marks 2016). Existing empirical research on outcomes of municipal merger 
referenda shows that both functional considerations – potential tax benefits resulting from 
consolidation or improvements in public services – and concerns for political self-
determination – fear of losing political control in the new entity –affect voters’ 
willingness to accept local territorial reforms (Marando and Whitley 1972; Austin 1999; 
Brink 2004; Miyazaki 2014). However, we know little about the relative importance and 
the interplay of functional pressures and concerns for self-determination in municipal 
merger referenda. In this paper, I assess how these factors are linked to local 
constituencies’ decisions at the ballots. 
Three Swiss cantons1 provide the empirical basis for this endeavor. Swiss 
municipal mergers are not enforced by higher government tiers but the result of bottom-
up coalition formation processes by local governments. The affected voters have the final 
say on whether a merger project initiated by their local representatives is implemented or 
not: popular votes in each involved municipality determine the fate of the merger project. 
This setting allows for an analysis of the conditions under which citizens accept or reject 
a merger. 
The quantitative analysis of popular vote decisions in 541 municipalities shows 
that both functional pressures and concerns for self-determination matter. However, it 
seems that only when functional pressures for reform are below a certain threshold, 
concerns for self-determination become relevant for voters’ decisions. This has 
implications for the postfunctionalist theory of governance and for policy-makers’ 
strategies in merger reforms. 
2. Voluntary Municipal Mergers in Switzerland 
Voluntary municipal mergers are a rather rare phenomenon. In most countries that 
experienced a large-scale territorial reform of the local government landscape, national or 
regional government tiers implemented these reforms top-down (Baldersheim and Rose 
2010a). However, since the new millennium, voluntary municipal mergers have become 
                                                        
1 Cantons are the important intermediate government tiers between the local and the national level in 
Switzerland. 
more frequent. For example, Finland, Japan, and Switzerland have witnessed heightened 
voluntary merger activity, leading to a sizable reduction in the number of local 
governments. In these countries, national or regional government tiers provide financial 
incentives for their local governments to merge (Kaiser 2014; Saarimaa and Tukiainen 
2015; Weese 2015). Other countries also experienced voluntary mergers, albeit to a lesser 
extent. In the Netherlands, the substantial reduction of municipalities in the last 15 years 
was partly due to voluntary mergers (Allers and Geertsema 2016, 665), the few 
Norwegian municipalities involved in merger projects held local referenda on them 
(Baldersheim and Rose 2010b, 91) and even French municipalities start to engage in 
voluntary mergers (Pasquier 2017). In sum, while remaining rather rare compared to top-
down mergers, voluntary bottom-up mergers have become more widespread in the last 20 
years. 
However, not all voluntary merger projects are implemented. A substantial 
amount of them fails to survive a popular vote. Consider the example of the United 
States: voluntary municipal mergers in the US predominantly take the form of city-
county consolidation. Norris (2015, 113–18) reports a total of 150 city-county 
consolidation votes between 1947 and 2010, only 32 of which were successful. It is thus 
important to understand under which circumstances local constituencies are opposed to 
merger projects. 
Swiss municipal mergers are ideal research objects for studying this question, 
because Swiss citizens have the final say on municipal merger projects in local referenda. 
Local government in Switzerland is strong both in functional and in political terms and 
plays an important role for citizens as service provider, but also as a focal point for 
identification and political participation (Hesse and Sharpe 1991, 607). Therefore, 
mergers can be a highly contested issue. The three Swiss cantons studied here have 
experienced a substantial reduction in municipality numbers since the new millennium 
compared to the average Swiss canton (see Figure B.1 in the Online Appendix). 
Table 1: The Three Cantons in the Swiss Context 
 
BE FR VD 
Swiss Cantons 
 Mean P25 P50 P75 
N Municipalities 400 245 384 111 22 81 169 
Inhabitants/Municipality 2,358 945 1,604 5,594 1,757 2,573 4,631 
Population 979,802 278,493 713,281 302,698 70,032 220,533 377,610 
Inhabitants/km2 167.74 174.73 252.69 481.61 90.93 229.17 322.94 
% Urban Population 62.57 55.75 74.67 60.85 49.82 66.37 87.71 
Municipality Types        
% Urban 13.96 11.02 17.15 27.61 13.96 22.16 35.71 
% Periurban 38.17 54.41 63.11 34.81 18.07 36.15 54.41 
% Rural 47.86 34.56 19.74 37.58 20.76 31.67 51.25 
Note. Data Source: Federal Statistical Office (2012, 2017); Data for year 2010; N 
Municipalities and Inhabitants/Municipality for year 2000. 
Moreover, these three cantons had a rather fragmented local government 
landscape in 2000 compared to the average Swiss canton; they also had a much higher 
number of local governments (Table 1). In Fribourg and Vaud the mean local population 
size was below the 25th percentile of the average Swiss canton and in Bern it ranged in 
between the 25th percentile and the median of the other Swiss cantons. Apart from their 
fragmented local government landscape, the three cantons vary with respect to other 
features as well. Bern and Vaud are among the largest Swiss cantons, while Fribourg 
neatly represents the average. Population density and the percentage of urban population 
range below the median in Bern and Fribourg and above it in Vaud. Finally, different 
municipality types are present to varying degrees in the three cantons. In Bern, almost 
half of the municipalities are rural, while in Fribourg and Vaud, more than half and 
almost two-thirds, respectively, belong to the periurban type.2  
It is important to note that the municipalities involved in municipal mergers in the 
three cantons do not make a random sample and are not representative of Swiss 
municipalities in general – especially not in terms of population size and density. This is 
a potential challenge to external validity. Yet, the aim of this paper is not to infer to 
municipalities in general, but only to municipalities involved in merger processes. In that 
respect, the selected cantons provide a good starting point: like in Switzerland as a whole, 
municipal merger projects in the three cantons predominantly involve smaller 
municipalities in a suburban and rural context. 
Swiss cantons play an important role in triggering municipal mergers. While they 
don’t force local governments to merge, cantons encourage municipal mergers through 
lump-sum payments and administrative assistance. The former is an almost necessary 
precondition for municipal mergers (Kaiser 2014). While cantons induce merger projects 
through financial incentives, they don’t exert additional control over whether merger 
projects are accepted or rejected by local constituencies.3 The latter decide autonomously 
in local referenda whether they want to implement a merger project initiated by their 
local representatives or whether they prefer their municipality to remain independent. The 
three cantons studied here all provide financial incentives to merge. The rules for 
                                                        
2 Periurban municipalities are located at the outskirts of urban areas and exhibit both urban and rural 
elements (Federal Statistical Office 2012). 
3 For the distinction between merger initiation, normally by local representatives, and merger decision by 
the affected constituencies, see Strebel (2018). 
obtaining and the formulas for calculating financial incentives are almost identical across 
the three cantons.4 
In sum, these three cantons are suitable cases for a study of why voluntary 
municipal merger projects fail. First, they all exhibit a high number of municipal merger 
projects since the new millennium, facilitating a quantitative study of merger decisions. 
Second, they represent typical contexts in which Swiss municipal mergers take place. 
Finally, they all use very similar systems to incentivize voluntary municipal mergers. 
3. Push and Pull Factors in Municipal Merger Referenda 
Scholars analyzing the determinants for municipal mergers commonly distinguish 
between factors that push a municipality towards a merger and factors that pull a 
municipality away from it. The former can be conceived of as functional pressures – such 
as smallness or financial difficulties – driving municipalities towards a merger, while the 
latter revolve around questions of self-determination and local identity (Austin 1999; 
Steiner 2003; Calciolari, Cristofoli, and Macciò 2013; Hyytinen, Saarimaa, and 
Tukiainen 2014). 
Most existing studies analyze whether a municipality merged or not and how 
these factors are associated with that outcome. Very few studies distinguish between 
municipalities that merged successfully and those that attempted to merge but failed to do 
                                                        
4 The details of the three incentive systems are presented in Appendix A. 
so because a (local) veto player rejected the project. As a consequence, we don’t know 
under which conditions voters accept or reject a merger project at the ballots.5 
A second shortcoming of existing research is that it remains silent about the 
relative importance and the interplay of functional pressures and concerns for self-
determination. In their seminal postfunctionalist theory of governance, Hooghe and 
Marks (2016) argue that the scale at which a certain public service is produced is the 
result of a functionalist push and a communal pull. The push consists in the attempt to 
produce public services at the optimal scale to be most cost-efficient and effective. The 
pull comes from communities’ desire to control decision-making in certain policy areas. 
When the functional push and the communal pull collide, so the argument goes, the 
communal pull will be stronger: communities are eager to preserve their self-
determination in areas and on issues that are important to them. Do concerns for self-
determination override the importance of functional pressures in referendums on 
territorial reform as suggested by Hooghe and Marks (2016)? Or are functional pressures 
more salient for voters’ decisions on municipal mergers? 
In the remainder of this section, I present hypotheses on the role of these push- 
and pull factors for voters’ decision on municipal mergers in legally binding popular 
votes. 
  
                                                        
5 Exceptions are the studies by Calciolari, Cristofoli, and Macciò (2013) and Strebel (2018) for Switzerland 
and Miyazaki (2014) for Japan. All of them include failed merger projects in their analysis of merger 
determinants. 
3.1 Functional Pressures 
The main argument in favor of municipal mergers presented by amalgamation advocates 
is that mergers allow municipalities to benefit from scale economies (Steiner 2003, 555). 
For certain public goods, unit costs can be lowered with production at a larger scale 
(Bikker and Van der Linde 2016). A merger would thus allow municipalities to save 
costs (Steiner and Kaiser 2017). Recent research has cast serious doubt on this argument, 
however. Blom-Hansen et al. (2016) convincingly argue and empirically demonstrate that 
scale effects are not to be expected after a municipal merger.6 However, what is relevant 
here is not so much whether the argument on scale economies is objectively correct, but 
how municipal mergers are presented in public discourse, since this is (part of) what 
voters ultimately base their decision on. In the Swiss discourse on municipal mergers, the 
argument is very prominent among merger advocates and might thus have a profound 
influence on local constituencies’ decisions: Local representatives of a municipality 
involved in a merger will likely use these arguments in favor of a merger that they co-
initiated – in case the argument fits the situation of their municipality. 
Two kinds of municipalities are particularly likely to be convinced by this 
argument: poor and small ones. Poor municipalities can face substantial difficulties in 
maintaining decent public service levels. They might perceive amalgamating as a viable 
way out of this situation. Empirically, this contention is corroborated by studies on 
municipal-level merger determinants. Calciolari, Cristofoli, and Macciò (2013) for the 
                                                        
6 Moreover, scale economies can be achieved not only through municipal mergers, but also through inter-
municipal cooperation schemes in different policy domains (Steiner 2003). 
Swiss canton of Ticino and Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2014) for Finland find that poor 
municipalities are more likely to merge. Small municipalities can face pressures similar 
to poor ones. The unit costs of production for certain services – especially for capital-
intensive goods such as power, water and waste disposal – are particularly high in very 
small municipalities. Small municipalities might thus be very tempted to respond to the 
call of scale economies. This is confirmed by the few existing studies. For the Swedish 
local government reform in 1952, Hanes, Wikström and Wångmar (2012) find that small 
municipalities complain less to the central government about forced mergers. In a study 
of mergers in the Swiss canton of Fribourg, Strebel (2018) shows that small 
municipalities have a higher probability of both initiating and successfully completing 
merger projects. Finally, studying merger referenda in Japan, Miyazaki (2014, 402) finds 
projected efficiency gains to be associated with a higher vote share in favor of a merger. 
When deciding on a municipal merger, local constituencies are exposed to the prevailing 
discourse on scale economies and municipal mergers and might act accordingly. We can 
thus expect that: 
H1a: Rich municipalities are more likely to reject a merger project. 
H1b: Large municipalities are more likely to reject a merger project. 
3.2 Concern for Self-Determination 
A prominent argument against large polities is that citizens’ opportunities to make their 
voices heard are smaller (Dahl and Tufte 1974, 13–15). Indeed, recent empirical studies 
report consistently negative effects of municipal mergers on citizens’ feeling of internal 
political efficacy (Lassen and Serritzlew 2011), their trust in local government (Hansen 
2013) and their participation in local elections (Koch and Rochat 2017). Municipal 
mergers thus seem to profoundly shake up existing local communities. This is 
particularly problematic for communities more concerned with self-determination. 
Here, I discuss three factors that can capture concerns for self-determination: the 
vote share of right-wing parties, cohesion of the local community, and a municipality’s 
population share in the merger coalition. Hooghe and Marks (2016) use ethno-nationalist 
parties’ vote shares as a proxy to grasp the salience of the desire for self-determination 
among subnational communities. These TAN parties7 usually mobilize against the 
centralization of policy-making and the integration of political communities – at different 
territorial scales (Mazzoleni 2005). TAN parties hence also tend to oppose municipal 
mergers. We would thus expect that in municipalities with a high vote share for TAN 
parties, local self-determination is more salient for local constituencies. In addition, a 
higher TAN party vote share indicates stronger mobilization potential against a municipal 
merger and antagonistic campaigns fall on more fertile soil. 
H2a: Municipalities with a higher TAN vote share are more likely to 
reject a merger project. 
The cohesion of local communities might influence the probability of rejecting a merger 
as well. Local communities with strong social networks and with residents actively 
engaged in local matters are likely to be more concerned with local autonomy and 
independence (Marcal and Svorny 2000, 100). It is difficult to capture the strength of 
                                                        
7 TAN stands for traditionalist/authoritarian/nationalist ideology. It constitutes one extreme of the so-called 
‘new politics’ cleavage. The other extreme is the GAL (green/alternative/liberal) ideology (Hooghe, Marks, 
and Wilson 2002). 
social networks and local engagement via official statistics. An indicator associated with 
having strong local ties and feeling attached to the local community is residence duration 
and migration experience (Kasarda and Janowitz 1974). The longer individuals reside in 
a certain place, the more they establish a bond with it (Lewicka 2011). This individual-
level logic can also be transferred to the aggregate level of the local community. The 
more the local population changes, the more difficult it is to sustain a vibrant 
associational life and stable local networks. New residents first need to familiarize with 
the local community and cannot readily replace longer-term residents who have left. 
Hence, in municipalities with a high share of incoming and outgoing migrants, local 
social networks and community ties are likely to be weaker. For referenda on municipal 
mergers, it is likely that such municipalities are less opposed. They have less to lose in 
terms of a vibrant local community life which might be stirred up by a municipal merger. 
H2b: Municipalities with low population fluctuation are more likely to 
reject a merger project. 
Finally, the relative size of a municipality in a merger coalition might matter for 
local communities’ decisions. In municipalities making up a large part of a merger 
coalition, voters probably won’t be too concerned about losing political influence in the 
new municipality. For small partners, however, a merger means a substantial loss of 
control and self-determination. They become the minority in the new municipality and 
risk that their interests are given less consideration, since local representatives have an 
incentive to base their electoral success on the majority’s interests (Jakobsen and Kjaer 
2016). 
H2c: The lower a municipality’s share of a merger project’s overall 
population, the more likely it is that it will reject the merger. 
3.3 Alternative Explanations 
3.3.1 Economic and Political Homogeneity 
A prominent explanation for municipalities merging behavior with one another is their 
degree of similarity with respect to economic and political factors (Bhatti and Hansen 
2011; Saarimaa and Tukiainen 2014; Bruns, Freier, and Schumann 2015). 
The relative economic well-being of a municipality, compared to its project 
partners, is a first factor that can have an impact on local constituencies’ decisions. 
Economic homogeneity matters ‘since no municipality would accept a partner in a 
substantially worse position than themselves’ (Bhatti and Hansen 2011, 220). In 
Switzerland, resource disparities among merger partners are a salient issue in local 
debates on municipal mergers. We can expect citizens to be more critical of a merger 
when its project partners are less well off.8 
In addition, local constituencies might prefer to merge with municipalities in 
which voters have similar preferences. Then it is more likely that their policy preferences 
                                                        
8 The literature on common-pool problems in the course of merger processes also deserves brief attention 
here: Municipalities involved in mergers often engage in last-minute spending before the merger is 
implemented. The rationale for doing so is that the accumulated debt will be taken over by the new 
municipality and hence free-riding on the common pool of the future municipality is possible (Hinnerich 
2009). In the present analysis, I don’t take this common-pool problem into account, since the last-minute 
spending normally only starts after the decision to implement the merger has been taken (Saarimaa and 
Tukiainen 2015). In the case at hand, municipalities are one step prior to this stage. Starting to overspend 
their budget, assuming that the merger will pass at the ballots when it might not, would thus be a very risky 
strategy. 
are also respected after a merger. Existing studies confirm this idea. Bruns, Freier, and 
Schumann (2015) show that the higher the vote share of the dominant party in a 
Brandenburg merger coalition, the more likely this coalition is to merge voluntarily. 
Similary, Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2014) show that Finnish municipalities in which the 
median voter is further from the coalition average are less likely to accept a municipal 
merger and that voters in merged municipalities tend to concentrate their votes on local 
candidates from their part of the municipality – especially when they might be overruled 
by the rest of the municipality (Saarimaa and Tukiainen 2016). 
3.3.2 Financial Incentive 
Another important factor is the financial incentive that the cantons provide for municipal 
mergers. The lump-sum payment municipalities receive in case a specific merger project 
is accepted in the popular vote is fixed and can be calculated in advance according to the 
formula laid down in cantonal legislation.9 As a consequence, local constituencies 
involved in a merger project know exactly how much money they would receive per 
capita if a merger is accepted in the popular vote. It is thus conceivable that local 
constituencies from municipalities involved in merger projects with higher per capita 
contributions from the canton are more likely to accept a merger.10  
3.3.3 Merger Experience, Merger Partners and Local Institutions 
                                                        
9 The formula for calculating the financial incentive for merger projects in the three cantons is presented in 
Appendix A. 
10 Weese (2015) provides an extensive analysis of the impact of the national government’s financial 
incentives on voluntary municipal merger activity in Japan. He shows that the intensity of the financial 
incentive is positively linked to merger probability among Japanese municipalities. 
A municipality’s merger history might also matter for its constituency’s decision to 
merge or not. Some of the municipalities in the dataset have merged more than once since 
the new millennium and others have started a new attempt after a first attempt failed. 
Previous merger project experience might affect later popular vote decisions. For 
example, municipalities with a failed attempt might exhibit a lower rejection probability 
than municipalities whose previous attempts succeeded or that never attempted to merge 
before, since local representatives would probably not advocate participation in a new 
merger project when they know that their voters are firmly opposed to it. 
A second factor that might matter for local constituencies’ decision is the number 
of municipalities involved in a merger project. If a merger involves more than two 
municipalities, this might generate opposition, since finding agreements with several 
municipalities can be more challenging and citizens’ might perceive their voice in this 
process to be significantly lower than when they merge with one municipality only 
(Hanes, Wikström, and Wångmar 2012, 2742). 
Finally, Swiss municipalities vary with respect to an important institutional 
feature, namely whether their legislative organ consists of elected representatives, i.e. a 
parliament, or whether legislation is done by a municipal assembly in which all 
enfranchised citizens can participate. This distinction is important for two reasons. First, 
in assembly municipalities, the merger decision is taken in the assembly, whereas in 
parliament municipalities it is taken at the ballot box. In the former case the vote is 
directly preceded by a public discussion among voters and representatives, whereas no 
such discussion takes place in parliament municipalities. Parliament municipalities might 
have a higher rejection probability, since there is no possibility for local representatives 
to convince opponents face-to-face. Second, however, parliament municipalities might be 
better at integrating different interests at an early stage, since more diverse factions are 
involved through the parliament, than in assembly municipalities where local executives 
dominate the process. This would mean that municipal merger projects are more 
successful at the ballot box than in the municipal assembly. 
4. Data, Operationalization and Estimation 
4.1 Data and Operationalization 
The dependent variable of interest in this study is whether voters in a municipality 
involved in a merger project reject the merger in a popular vote or not. The data is 
obtained from the municipality departments of the three cantons (Department of 
Municipalities Bern 2017; Department of Municipalities Fribourg 2017; Department of 
Municipalities Vaud 2017). Table 2 gives an overview of the dependent variable across 
the three cantons. On average, 14.6% of the municipalities involved in a merger project 
rejected it in the popular vote. In Bern, this number is higher (20.6%), while in Fribourg 
(11.7%) and in Vaud (13.9%) it is lower. 
Table 2. Dependent Variable: Merger Rejection by Canton (2000-
2017) 
 Accepted Rejected Total 
Bern 108 (79.4) 28 (20.6) 136 (100) 
Fribourg 211 (88.3) 28 (11.7) 239 (100) 
Vaud 143 (86.1) 23 (13.9) 166 (100) 
Total 462 (85.4) 79 (14.6) 541 (100) 
Note. Percentages in parentheses. 
A merger project can only be implemented, if all involved municipalities accept it 
in the referendum. Out of the 166 merger projects, 50 could not be implemented because 
they got rejected by at least one involved municipality. 19 of those projects were rejected 
by more than one of the participating municipalities and in 8 of them, more than half of 
the municipalities rejected the merger project. A possible concern for the analysis is that 
decisions in one municipality might affect decisions in other municipalities of the merger 
coalition. Fortunately, in the cases at hand, popular votes on municipal mergers are held 
at the same time in all the municipalities of a merger coalition – precisely to prevent such 
influence. 
The data for the independent variables also stems from the three cantons’ 
municipality departments. Unless otherwise stated, the indicators are measured one year 
prior to the merger vote to make sure they predate the merger decision.11 
The financial situation of a municipality is measured by two indicators. 
Debt/capita, referring to a municipality’s net debt (when positive) or its net assets (when 
negative), captures the municipality’s current economic situation whereas the municipal 
tax rate approximates the municipality’s structural condition over the longer run. Less 
well-off municipalities tend to have higher municipal tax rates. Municipal size is 
measured by its population. A logarithmic transformation is applied to normalize the 
distribution of this indicator. 
The TAN vote share is operationalized through the vote share of the right-wing 
Swiss People’s Party (SVP) in the last national parliamentary elections predating the 
merger decision. I use the vote share in national elections because it ensures 
                                                        
11 Descriptive statistics for these indicators can be found in Table B.1 (Online Appendix). 
comparability across municipalities. Not all municipalities in the three cantons have local 
parliaments – in some of them, especially the smaller ones, citizens’ assemblies constitute 
the legislative branch – so we would have to rely on elections of local executives, which 
are subject to very different dynamics across municipalities. Population fluctuation is 
measured by the sum of immigrants and emigrants in a municipality in a given year 
divided by its population size. Finally, population ratio corresponds to the population 
size of municipality divided by the population size of the merger coalition. 
The relative economic well-being of a municipality is operationalized by two 
indicators. Both the tax rate difference and the debt/capita difference are calculated by 
subtracting the mean value of the merger coalition from the value of municipality i. 
Positive values for the tax rate difference thus indicate that municipality i has a higher tax 
rate than the mean (and might thus benefit from a tax reduction as a result of a merger), 
while negative values for the debt/capita difference mean that municipality i is better off 
than the average municipality in the merger coalition (and might have to take on debt 
from other municipalities as a result of a merger). Political homogeneity is 
operationalized with two indicators, capturing two dimensions of political competition – 
an economic left-right and a cultural liberal-communitarian dimension (Hooghe, Marks, 
and Wilson 2002). The economic dimension is operationalized by the difference in the 
social democratic party vote share of municipality i compared to the mean of the merger 
coalition and the cultural dimension is operationalized by the same difference in the TAN 
vote share. Again, the data comes from national elections to ensure comparability across 
municipalities. Finally, the payment per capita municipality i would receive from the 
canton in case the merger is implemented is calculated according to the formulas reported 
in Appendix A. 
4.2 Estimation 
To test the hypotheses formulated in Section 3, I rely on multilevel logistic regression. 
Logistic regression accounts for the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable. 
Furthermore, multilevel modeling is needed due to the hierarchical nature of the data. 
The unit of analysis is the individual municipality. However, individual municipalities in 
the dataset are nested in higher-order structures in three different ways. First, 
municipalities involved in the same merger project might share certain unobserved 
features which might influence local constituencies’ decision to reject a merger in a 
popular vote. Second, municipalities located in the same canton are subject to the exact 
same higher-tier institutional context while municipalities from different cantons are not. 
Finally, municipalities are not only nested in merger projects and cantons but also in time 
periods. It might be that there is a temporal dynamic to the rejection of municipal 
mergers, e.g. that merger projects at the beginning of the new millennium were more 
likely to be rejected than later ones. 
The first hierarchical relationship – municipalities nested in merger projects – is 
accounted for through the random intercepts of the multilevel model (Hox 2010, 11). To 
deal with the second and the third hierarchy, I have to rely on fixed effects – i.e. the 
inclusion of canton- and time-period dummy variables – because of the small number of 
higher-level units, which does not allow for the use of further levels in the multilevel 
regression model. 
5. Results 
How important are functional pressures and concerns for self-determination for our 
understanding of local constituencies’ decisions in merger referenda? 
Figure 1 shows average marginal effects of the different predictors derived from 
three different multilevel logistic regression models.12 The first one only includes the 
factors measuring functional pressures, the second one only the factors associated with 
self-determination and the third one includes both sets of indicators as well as the 
alternative explanations.13 The results suggest that the fiscal indicators – debt/capita and 
tax rate – are not linked to the probability of rejecting a merger, neither in the functional 
pressures-only nor in the full model. We can thus reject hypothesis H1a. 
The other coefficients exhibit an interesting pattern. In the respective submodels 
they are substantively smaller – and the three indicators for self-determination are not 
statistically significant. However, in the full model, these coefficients all become more 
sizable and statistically significant. Here, a change from the 10th to the 90th percentile in 
population size – corresponding to an increase of 2’100 inhabitants – is associated with a 
                                                        
12 A comparison of mean differences at the level of the individual municipality and at the level of the 
merger coalition can be found in Tables B.2 and B.3 in Online Appendix B. 
13 Alternative explanations are not very relevant for understanding merger rejection, except for the tax rate 
difference and for having been involved in a failed merger project prior to the current one. The probability 
of rejecting a merger decreases by 26 percentage points when moving from the minimum to the maximum 
value of the tax rate difference. And for municipalities with a failed merger attempt the probability to reject 
a merger lies 10 percentage points lower compared to those without prior merger attempts. Merging with 
more than two municipalities and having a parliament are significantly associated with merger rejection, 
but only when population size is not included in the model (models (4) and (5)). The canton- and time-
period fixed effects are all insignificant (see Table B.4 in Online Appendix B). To test the robustness of the 
findings under alternative specifications, I have estimated linear probability models, logistic regression 
models with standard errors clustered by merger coalition, and logistic regression models with robust 
standard errors. The substantive results remain the same across all these specifications (see Tables C.1, C.2, 
and C.3 in Online Appendix C). 
37 percentage points increase in local constituencies’ probability of rejecting a merger in 
the popular vote, holding all other variables constant at their mean. The same change in 
TAN vote share – corresponding to a 30 percentage point vote share increase – is linked 
to a 18 percentage point increase in rejection probability. When population fluctuation 
increases from 10th to 90th percentile – 15 percentage points increase in fluctuation – 
rejection probability still decreases by 8 percentage points, and when population ratio 
changes from 5 to 75 percent, the probability of rejecting a merger decreases by 27 
percentage points.  
 
Figure 1. Coefficient Plot: Functional Pressures and Self-Determination  
Note. Predicted probabilities are based on multilevel logistic regression models (1), (2), and (6) 
from Table B.4 (Online Appendix); all other variables are held constant at their mean. 
In the full model, we thus find support for hypotheses H1b, H2a, H2b, and H2c. Yet, 
it remains puzzling why we find these effects only in the full model, but not in the 
submodels. In what follows, I explore this issue further. 
The encountered pattern clearly points to the relative importance of functional 
pressures and self-determination – or rather to certain conditions under which they are 
more or less relevant. The most plausible explanation for this pattern is that these 
variables only exert an effect on a subgroup of municipalities and not among all of them. 
But what subgroups should we look at? Figure 1 suggests that small and large 
municipalities should be assessed in more detail, because the effect of population size 
also becomes larger in the full model. Testing the full model with and without the 
population size variable confirms this assumption: the effects of the three indicators for 
self-determination become stronger, once population size is included in the model.14 
To explore this conjunction between a municipality’s population size and the the 
self-determination indicators further, I have estimated predicted probabilities of the three 
self-determination indicators for small (10th percentile) and large (90th percentile) 
municipalities, holding all other variables constant at their mean. The results suggest that 
the effects of TAN vote share, population fluctuation, and population ratio are much 
more pronounced among large municipalities (Figure 2). For small municipalities, the 
rejection probability is never higher than 6%, irrespective of the values of the three self-
determination variables. For large municipalities, the rejection probability is much higher 
– reflecting the direct effect of population size. In addition, however, we can see that the 
                                                        
14 See model (5) in Table B.4 (Online Appendix). 
difference in rejection probability between municipalities with a low and a high TAN 
vote share, population fluctuation, and population ratio is much higher among large 
municipalities. For the TAN vote share and the population ratio, these differences are 
statistically significant with 95% confidence. This suggests that concerns for self-
determination matter for voters’ decisions in larger municipalities only – where the 
functional pressures of smallness are less pertinent. It seems that, once these pressures are 
less strong, concerns for self-determination become very important. The results here 
suggest that they can be decisive for the success of a merger project in large 
municipalities. 
Figure 3. Size and Self-Determination  
Note. Predicted probabilities are based on multilevel logistic regression model (6) from Table B.4 
(Online Appendix); all other variables are held constant at their mean. Municipality Size: P10=130 
inhabitants, P90=2,230 inhabitants. TAN Vote share: P10=.15, P90=.46; Population Fluctuation: 
P10=.09, P90=.22 Population Ratio: P10=.05, P90=.75. 
To corroborate this finding further, I a.) conduct subgroup analyses for small and 
large municipalities, and b.) estimate interaction effects between population size and the 
three self-determination variables. The subgroup analysis confirms the results from figure 
2. (see table B.5 and figure B.2 in the Online Appendix). While the coefficients for the 
self-determination indicators are small and insignificant for small municipalities, they are 
more pronounced and – in the case of TAN vote share and population ratio – also 
statistically significant for large municipalities. This corroborates the finding that only 
when functional pressures, here in the form of smallness, are not too prevalent, do 
concerns for self-determination become relevant for voters’ decisions on merger projects. 
In addition to these subgroup analyses, we can also estimate interaction effects of 
municipality size and the three self-determination indicators. We would expect that the 
interaction effect points in the same direction as the coefficient of the respective indicator 
for self-determination. When this is the case, the effect of the self-determination indicator 
gets more pronounced as municipality size increases – which corresponds to what we 
have observed so far. Table 3 contains results for both a multilevel logistic regression 
model and for a linear probability model.15 While the coefficients for the interaction 
terms are not significant – except for the interaction between size and population ratio – 
we can see that they all point in the expected direction: the effect of self-determination 
concerns tends to increase as municipality size increases. 
                                                        
15 I report a linear probability model here as a robustness check, since the significance and the size of the 
marginal effects of interaction terms in logistic regression models depend on the values of the covariates in 
the model (Ai and Norton 2003). The log-odds of the interaction effect (reported for the multilevel logistic 
regression models in Table 3) are not affected by this problem, however. Graphs illustrating the interaction 
effects from the multilevel logistic regression models and from the linear probability models can be found 
in Figure C.1 and C.2 in Online Appendix C. 
Table 3. Interaction Models: Size x Self-Determination 
 MLLa  LPMb 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Log. Population 1.526*** 1.592*** 1.667***  0.114*** 0.121*** 0.123*** 
 (0.307) (0.307) (0.303)  (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) 
TAN Vote Share 5.768**    0.553***   
 (1.982)    (0.167)   
Population Fluctuation  -6.777    -0.493  
  (3.548)    -0.27  
Population Ratio   -2.339    -0.244* 
   (1.210)    (0.108) 
Log. Population x  1.878    0.226   
TAN Vote Share (1.509)    (0.120)   
Log. Population x  -0.585    -0.189  
Population Fluctuation  (3.188)    (0.204)  
Log. Population x   -2.028**    -0.150** 
Population Ratio   (0.688)    (0.050) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Canton FEs Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Time Period FEs Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Log. Lik. -168.60 -169.38 -164.40  -149.25 -150.65 -146.41 
AIC 385 387 377  347 349 341 
 BIC 488 490 480  449 452 444 
Note. *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001. N level-1 (Municipalities)=541, N level-2 (Merger Projects)=166. 
aMLL=Multilevel Logistic Regression Models. bLPM=Linear Probability Models. Log. Population, 
TAN Vote Share, Population Fluctuation, and Population Ratio are centered at the median to 
obtain meaningful baseline coefficients of the interacted variables. Coefficients are log-odds for 
the multilevel logistic regression models and OLS coefficients for the linear probability models. 
In sum, based on the results and the different tests reported here, we can clearly 
corroborate hypothesis H1b: larger municipalities are more likely to vote against a merger 
project. In addition, we can partially corroborate hypotheses H2a and H2c: large 
municipalities with a higher TAN vote share and with a smaller relative size in the 
merger coalition are more likely to vote against a merger project. While there’s evidence 
for hypothesis H2b as well, the coefficient for population fluctuation comes with large 
confidence intervals and is not statistically significant in three of the four specifications 
reported here. We thus reject hypothesis H2b. 
6. Discussion 
What role do functional pressures and concerns for political self-determination play in 
voluntary municipal mergers referenda? In this analysis of 541 municipalities involved in 
166 different merger projects in three Swiss cantons, voters of every seventh municipality 
rejected a merger project initiated by their local representatives in a local referendum. 
Larger municipalities are particularly prone to reject merger proposals. Moreover, 
municipalities with strong right-wing parties and municipalities that would lose political 
influence as a result of a merger are more likely to vote against a merger project. These 
findings are in line with existing research on local government amalgamation – potential 
scale economy benefits have been found to matter for decisions in Japanese (Miyazaki 
2014) and Swiss (Strebel 2018) local merger referenda. In addition, concerns for political 
control are associated with municipal mergers in a variety of different contexts (Marando 
and Whitley 1972; Hyytinen, Saarimaa, and Tukiainen 2014; Jakobsen and Kjaer 2016; 
Strebel 2018). This in turn suggests that the findings of this study might be generalizable 
to other contexts in which local referenda on municipal mergers are held, such as Finland, 
Japan and the US. 
This study suggests that functional pressures and concerns for self-determination 
are interdependent: only in municipalities that are sufficiently large, voters are led by 
concerns for self-determination. In small municipalities, the vote share of right-wing 
parties and a municipality’s population share in a merger coalition is not associated with 
the probability to reject a merger in a popular vote. This has implications for the 
prominent contention that functional pressures are subordinate to concerns for self-
determination as stated in the postfunctionalist theory of governance (Hooghe and Marks 
2016). It seems that this is only true for some municipalities, namely those that are not 
subject to overwhelming functional pressures to amalgamate. 
This study has several limitations. First, we cannot draw any inferences about 
individual decision-making processes from this contextual analysis. For example, we 
don’t know whether right-wing party supporters are more likely to reject merger projects. 
However, the claims made don’t operate at the individual level. Rather, it is the context, 
the presence of a strong right-wing party mobilizing against a merger project, that affects 
local constituencies’ decisions. Second, the dependent variable only indicates whether or 
not a merger project was rejected by local constituencies, not how strong this rejection 
was. Data on the strength of the merger rejection in a particular municipality is not 
available for the cases at hand. What matters substantively, however, is whether a 
municipality rejected a merger project, not whether 51% or 80% of the voters did. 
Finally, the rejection of merger projects often hinges on other, more idiosyncratic, factors 
that cannot be considered in this study. For example, historical animosities between two 
municipalities might drive merger rejection in some cases. This study can only offer a 
‘birds-eye view’ of factors that on average increase or decrease merger rejection 
probability; it can’t provide a detailed assessment of individual cases. 
Future research should, therefore, investigate whether the factors associated with 
merger rejection here operate in a similar way in other contexts and whether individual-
level behavior corresponds to the assumptions made here. For the case at hand, merger 
decisions at the aggregate level largely seem to hinge on functional pressures in the form 
of small size and on concerns for self-determination in municipalities less exposed to 
such functional pressures. 
For policy-makers promoting municipal merger projects this has differentiated 
implications. For those advocating the merger of very small municipalities (<500 
inhabitants), emphasis on functional pressures municipalities face due to their smallness 
and how they might be alleviated through mergers seem to be sufficient. The task of 
policy-makers in larger municipalities (> 500 inhabitants) seems to be more complex. 
Resorting to a discourse of scale economies is not sufficient here. Rather, they have to 
take concerns for self-determination seriously. For one, they could avoid entering merger 
coalitions with municipalities substantively bigger than their own. Second, these concerns 
could be taken up by granting the smaller parts of the new municipality a fixed number of 
seats in the new local council or executive – thereby ensuring the continued local 
representation of these constituencies. 
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Appendix 
A. Details on Financial Incentives in the Three Cantons 
All three cantons studied here all incite mergers financially. Between 2000 and 2017, 
Fribourg has implemented two different schemes for inciting mergers, one that was 
limited for the period 2000 to 2006 and a second one that is in place since 2012 (but 
applies to mergers ex post facto that came into force in 2011). The laws from the cantons 
Bern and Vaud are in place since 2005 but can be applied ex post facto to mergers that 
came into force from 2003 onwards. The basic formula for calculating the financial 
incentive as of now is the same across the three cantons and looks as follows 
Lump-sum paymentBE, FR, VD = ෍
௡
௜ୀଵ
 (𝑥௜ ∗ 𝑎) ∗ ൬1 +
𝑛 − 2
10
൰ 
where xi refers to the population size of a municipality participating in a merger project, n 
is the total number of municipalities in a merger project, and a refers to the number of 
Swiss francs per capita in case a merger project is implemented (400 for Bern, 200 for 
Fribourg and 250 for Vaud). In all three cantons, municipalities that have merged already 
since the incentive is in place are not considered in the calculation of the incentive if they 
merge again. 
Besides these basic similarities, there are also some differences across cantons. Bern and 
Vaud have defined a maximum population size for each municipality that is considered 
for the calculation (1,000 in Bern and 1,500 in Vaud). Furthermore, Vaud only considers 
up to 3,000 inhabitants in total for the calculation. In Fribourg there’s neither an overall 
nor an individual size ceiling for the incentive calculation. The formula for calculating 
the financial incentive in Fribourg for the period 2000-2006 looks as follows 
Lump-sum paymentFR =෍൬𝑥௜ ∗ 𝑎 ∗
1
𝑐
൰
௡
௜ୀଵ
 
where xi again refers to the size of an individual municipality, n designates the total 
number of municipalities involved in a merger project, a amounts to 400 Swiss francs, 
and c is an index for the economic wellbeing of a municipality, where 1 refers to the 
mean and higher values to more economic wellbeing. A maximum number of 1,500 
inhabitants per municipality are considered for the calculation. 
 
Online Appendix 
B. Tables and Figures 
Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max P25 P50 P75 
Merger Rejection (=1) 541 0.15 0.35 0 1 0 0 0 
Debt/Capita (1000 CHF) 541 0.09 4.01 -10.88 22.72 -2.47 -0.14 2.21 
Tax Rate 541 1.08 0.44 0.5 2.7 0.78 0.9 1.25 
Log. Population 541 6.2 1.15 3.47 10.21 5.47 6.02 6.99 
Population (End of Year) 541 1039.74 1986.69 32 27101 237 413 1086 
TAN Vote Share 541 0.3 0.13 0.01 0.81 0.22 0.28 0.38 
Population Fluctuation 541 0.16 0.06 0 0.49 0.12 0.15 0.19 
Population Ratio 541 0.31 0.26 0.01 0.99 0.09 0.22 0.44 
Δ Tax Rate 541 0 0.08 -0.33 0.32 -0.05 0 0.05 
Δ Debt/Capita (1000 CHF) 541 0 2.59 -11.32 14.02 -1.44 -0.06 1.35 
Δ TAN Vote Share 541 0.05 0.05 0 0.4 0.02 0.04 0.07 
Δ Left Vote Share 541 0.04 0.03 0 0.28 0.01 0.03 0.05 
Payment/Capita (100 CHF) 535 3.86 1.99 0 8.89 2.2 4 5.19 
Previous Merger Attempt         
None 541 0.86 0.35 0 1 1 1 1 
Previous Merger Success 541 0.05 0.22 0 1 0 0 0 
Previous Merger Failed 541 0.09 0.29 0 1 0 0 0 
Parliament (=1) 541 0.12 0.32 0 1 0 0 0 
>2 Municipalities 541 0.71 0.45 0 1 0 1 1 
Canton         
Bern 541 0.25 0.43 0 1 0 0 1 
Fribourg 541 0.44 0.5 0 1 0 0 1 
Vaud 541 0.31 0.46 0 1 0 0 1 
Time Period         
2000-2002 541 0.07 0.26 0 1 0 0 0 
2003-2005 541 0.22 0.41 0 1 0 0 0 
2006-2008 541 0.08 0.27 0 1 0 0 0 
2009-2011 541 0.19 0.39 0 1 0 0 0 
2012-2014 541 0.23 0.42 0 1 0 0 0 
2015-2017 541 0.21 0.41 0 1 0 0 0 
 
Table B.2. Merger Rejection vs. Merger Acceptance 
Variable Merger Rejection  Merger Acceptance  Δ Mean 
 N Mean SD  N Mean SD   
Debt/Capita (1000 CHF) 79 0.01 4.09  462 0.1 4  0.08 n.s. 
Tax Rate 79 1.16 0.53  462 1.06 0.42  -0.1 * 
Population 79 1301.37 1408.57  462 995.01 2067.33  -306.36 n.s. 
TAN Vote Share 79 0.32 0.1  462 0.29 0.13  -0.03 * 
Population Fluctuation 79 0.15 0.04  462 0.16 0.06  0.01 n.s. 
Population Ratio 79 0.29 0.21  462 0.31 0.27  0.01 n.s. 
Δ Tax Rate 79 -0.02 0.08  462 0 0.08  0.02 * 
Δ Debt/Capita (1000 CHF) 79 0.3 2.83  462 -0.05 2.55  -0.35 n.s. 
Δ TAN Vote Share 79 0.05 0.04  462 0.05 0.05  0 n.s. 
ΔLeft Vote Share 79 0.03 0.03  462 0.04 0.03  0.01 * 
Payment/Capita (100 CHF) 76 3.36 1.75  459 3.94 2.02  0.57 ** 
Previous Merger Failed 79 0.01 0.11  462 0.11 0.31  0.09 ** 
Previous Merger Success 79 0.08 0.27  462 0.05 0.21  -0.03 n.s. 
>2 Municipalities 79 0.84 0.37  462 0.69 0.46  -0.15 ** 
Parliament (=1) 79 0.19 0.39  462 0.1 0.31  -0.09 * 
Note. One-sided t-tests, n.s.=not significant, *p<.05, **p<.01. 
 
 
Table B.3. Failed vs. Successful Merger Projects 
Variable Failed Projects  Successful Projects  Δ Mean 
 N Mean SD  N Mean SD   
Share Rejecting Municipalities 50 0.43 0.17  116 0 0    
Mean N Municipalities 50 3.88 1.88  116 2.99 1.63  0.89 ** 
Mean Debt/Capita (1000 CHF) 50 -0.02 3.27  116 0.18 3.41  -0.2 n.s. 
Mean Tax Rate 50 1.13 0.49  116 1.12 0.42  0.01 n.s. 
Mean Population Size 50 1206.66 942.27  116 1237.13 1868.7  -30.47 n.s. 
Mean TAN Vote Share 50 0.31 0.09  116 0.29 0.12  0.01 n.s. 
Mean Population Fluctuation 50 0.16 0.04  116 0.15 0.04  0.01 n.s. 
SD Population Size 50 795.1 781.75  116 1301.64 2455.42  -506.54 n.s. 
SD Tax Rate 50 0.08 0.05  116 0.08 0.08  0 n.s. 
SD Debt/Capita (1000 CHF) 50 2.48 1.62  115 2.25 1.91  -0.23 n.s. 
SD TAN Vote Share 50 0.06 0.04  116 0.07 0.06  -0.01 n.s. 
SD Left Vote Share 50 0.04 0.03  116 0.05 0.04  -0.01 n.s. 
Mean Payment/Capita (100 CHF) 48 3.34 1.63  116 3.57 1.87  -0.23 n.s. 
Note. One-sided t-tests, n.s.=not significant, **p<.01. 
 
Table B.4 Multilevel Logit Models for Merger Rejection (=1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Debt/Capita  0.045  0.052  0.075 0.118 
(1000 CHF) (0.044)  (0.046)  (0.079) (0.086) 
Tax Rate 0.119  -1.159  0.474 0.291 
 (1.043)  (1.064)  (1.303) (1.262) 
Log.  0.495***  1.451***   1.487*** 
Population (0.139)  (0.257)   (0.308) 
TAN Vote   1.526 4.677**  4.183* 6.445** 
Share  (1.591) (1.727)  (1.878) (1.980) 
Population   -2.685 -5.575  -5.481 -6.965* 
Fluctuation  (2.800) (3.263)  (3.086) (3.467) 
Population   0.213 -4.382***  -0.084 -4.182*** 
Ratio  (0.596) (1.028)  (0.805) (1.196) 
Δ Tax Rate    -3.240 -4.308 -4.587* 
    (1.736) (2.249) (2.302) 
Δ Debt/Capita     0.079 0.021 -0.040 
(1000 CHF)    (0.054) (0.097) (0.106) 
Δ TAN Vote     -4.038 -6.813 -5.801 
Share    (3.941) (4.096) (4.261) 
Δ Left Vote     -7.730 -6.916 -4.145 
Share    (5.959) (6.093) (6.382) 
Payment/Capita    -0.189 -0.229 0.082 
(100 CHF)    (0.122) (0.121) (0.127) 
Previous Merger 
Attempt 
(B=None) 
      
Merger Attempt     -2.100 -2.022 -2.167* 
Failed    (1.106) (1.118) (1.106) 
Merger Attempt     0.492 0.468 0.481 
Succeeded    (0.615) (0.642) (0.631) 
>2     1.361** 1.479** 0.739 
Municipalities    (0.473) (0.528) (0.546) 
Parliament     0.696 1.144* 0.164 
(=1)    (0.463) (0.535) (0.560) 
Constant -6.085* -2.651* -8.439** -2.239* -3.307 -12.295*** 
 (2.571) (1.117) (2.725) (1.008) (2.930) (3.517) 
Variance  1.162 1.431 0.833 0.949 0.769 0.425 
(Constant) (0.596) (0.663) (0.564) (0.557) (0.513) (0.421) 
Canton FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Period Fes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log. Lik. -203.33 -209.60 -188.20 -187.45 -182.48 -168.48 
χ2 21.77 10.41 39.14 32.99 39.71 52.71 
p>χ2 0.016 0.405 0.000 0.007 0.008 0.000 
AIC 431 443 406 411 411 385 
BIC 482 495 471 488 509 488 
Note. *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001. Cell entries are log odds obtained through -meqrlogit- command in Stata. 
Standard errors in parentheses. N level-1 (Municipalities)=541, N level-2 (Merger Projects)=166. 
Table B.5 Multilevel Logit Models for Merger Rejection (=1) 
 Population Size ≤ P50 Population Size > P50 
Debt/Capita (1000 CHF) 0.112 0.060 
 (0.194) (0.104) 
Tax Rate -4.054 1.023 
 (4.219) (1.496) 
TAN Vote Share 3.065 7.036** 
 (4.100) (2.524) 
Population Fluctuation -8.832 -8.834 
 (6.176) (5.100) 
Population Ratio 3.787 -2.543* 
 (3.042) (1.025) 
Δ Tax Rate 4.172 -9.447** 
 (5.874) (3.109) 
Δ Debt/Capita (1000 CHF) 0.143 -0.108 
 (0.233) (0.117) 
Δ TAN Vote Share -6.875 -2.169 
 (8.254) (5.690) 
Δ Left Vote Share -18.920 -1.971 
 (13.913) (7.896) 
Payment/Capita (100 CHF) -0.019 -0.231 
 (0.372) (0.138) 
Previous Merger Attempt (B=None)   
Merger Attempt Failed -17.682 -1.606 
 (1732.281) (1.110) 
Merger Attempt Succeeded  0.072 
  (0.627) 
>2 Municipalities 2.734 0.868 
 (1.640) (0.602) 
Parliament (=1) 21.911 0.915 
 (4593.925) (0.606) 
Constant 5.243 -3.146 
 (7.787) (3.692) 
Variance (Constant) 4.511 0.000 
 (3.911) (0.000) 
Canton FEs Yes Yes 
Time Period FEs Yes Yes 
N level-1 (Municipalities) 278 257 
N level-2 (Merger Projects) 130 137 
Log. Lik. -58.44 -103.01 
χ2 9.49 37.59 
p>χ2 0.977 0.014 
AIC 161 252 
BIC 241 334 
Note. *p<.05 **p<.01. Cell entries are log odds obtained through -meqrlogit- command in Stata. Standard 
errors in parentheses. 
  
Figure B.1. Development of Municipality Number  
Note. Data source: Swiss Federal Statistical Office. 
 
 
Figure B.2. Coefficient Plot: Small vs. Large Municipalities  
Note. Predicted probabilities are based on multilevel logistic regression models from 
 Table B.5; all other variables are held constant at their mean. Municipality Size: P50=410 
inhabitants.  
 C. Robustness Checks 
Table C.1 Linear Probability Models for Merger Rejection (=1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Debt/Capita  0.004  0.005  0.008 0.008 
(1000 CHF) (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.007) (0.006) 
Tax Rate 0.076  -0.035  0.094 0.117 
 (0.104)  (0.104)  (0.126) (0.123) 
Log.  0.057***  0.135***   0.119*** 
Population (0.014)  (0.020)   (0.024) 
TAN Vote   0.136 0.419**  0.360* 0.476** 
Share  (0.159) (0.158)  (0.164) (0.162) 
Population   -0.197 -0.363  -0.382 -0.407 
Fluctuation  (0.269) (0.260)  (0.262) (0.256) 
Population   -0.007 -0.408***  -0.054 -0.380*** 
Ratio  (0.060) (0.083)  (0.077) (0.099) 
Δ Tax Rate    -0.328 -0.504* -0.534* 
    (0.184) (0.230) (0.225) 
Δ Debt/Capita     0.008 0.001 -0.000 
(1000 CHF)    (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) 
Δ TAN Vote     -0.486 -0.719* -0.633 
Share    (0.348) (0.362) (0.354) 
Δ Left Vote     -0.574 -0.472 -0.067 
Share    (0.480) (0.482) (0.478) 
Payment/Capita     -0.018 -0.020* 0.002 
(100 CHF)    (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
Previous Merger 
Attempt (B=None) 
      
Merger Attempt     -0.108* -0.096 -0.113* 
Failed    (0.053) (0.054) (0.053) 
Merger Attempt     0.029 0.038 0.027 
Succeeded    (0.070) (0.072) (0.070) 
>2     0.130*** 0.122** 0.043 
Municipalities    (0.038) (0.042) (0.044) 
Parliament     0.097 0.150** 0.051 
(=1)    (0.051) (0.057) (0.059) 
Constant -0.355 0.145 -0.513* 0.197* 0.027 -0.713* 
 (0.242) (0.094) (0.246) (0.080) (0.258) (0.291) 
Cantons FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Period FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.043 0.013 0.092 0.067 0.076 0.119 
F 3.44 1.7 5.19 3.38 3.1 4.27 
(Vars, DF) (10, 530) (10, 530) (13, 527) (16, 518) (21, 513) (22, 512) 
p>F 0.000 0.078 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note. *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001. Cell entries are OLS estimates obtained through -regress- command in 
Stata. Standard errors in parentheses. N Municipalities=541. 
 
 Table C.2 Logit Models with Clustered Standard Errors for Merger Rejection (=1)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
Debt/Capita (1000 CHF) 0.040   0.127  
 (0.049)   (0.106)  
Tax Rate 0.596   0.227  
 (0.917)   (1.061)  
Log. Population 0.471***   1.413***  
 (0.109)   (0.310)  
TAN Vote Share  1.104  6.454**  
  (1.301)  (1.969)  
Population Fluctuation  -1.868  -6.762**  
  (1.828)  (2.490)  
Population Ratio  -0.041  -3.941**  
  (0.427)  (1.240)  
Δ Tax Rate   -2.809* -4.275*  
   (1.350) (1.845)  
Δ Debt/Capita (1000 CHF)   0.070 -0.055  
   (0.055) (0.123)  
Δ TAN Vote Share   -3.539 -5.411  
   (3.147) (3.679)  
Δ Left Vote Share   -8.139 -4.284  
   (5.631) (6.515)  
Payment/Capita (100 CHF)   -0.183 0.058  
   (0.128) (0.115)  
Previous Merger Attempt (B=None)      
Merger Attempt Failed   -2.052 -2.123  
   (1.057) (1.092)  
Merger Attempt Succeeded   0.262 0.366  
   (0.533) (0.582)  
>2 Municipalities   1.312** 0.820  
   (0.420) (0.497)  
Parliament (=1)   0.685 0.161  
   (0.397) (0.518)  
Constant -6.312** -1.957 -1.823* -11.689***  
 (2.195) (1.013) (0.765) (3.053)  
Canton FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Time Period FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Log. Lik. -208.27 -216.67 -190.66 -169.32  
χ2 30.22 11.27 50.85 91.16  
p>χ2 0.001 0.337 0.000 0.000  
AIC 439 455 415 385  
BIC 486 503 488 483  
 Note. *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001. Cell entries are log odds obtained through -logit- command in Stata. 
Merger project clustered standard errors in parentheses. N Municipalities=541, N Clusters (Merger 
Projects)=166. 
 
 Table C.3 Logit Models with Robust Standard Errors for Merger Rejection (=1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Debt/Capita (1000 CHF) 0.040   0.127 
 (0.042)   (0.098) 
Tax Rate 0.596   0.227 
 (0.836)   (1.152) 
Log. Population 0.471***   1.413*** 
 (0.104)   (0.316) 
TAN Vote Share  1.104  6.454*** 
  (1.186)  (1.927) 
Population Fluctuation  -1.868  -6.762* 
  (1.737)  (2.668) 
Population Ratio  -0.041  -3.941** 
  (0.410)  (1.211) 
Δ Tax Rate   -2.809 -4.275* 
   (1.506) (2.024) 
Δ Debt/Capita    0.070 -0.055 
(1000 CHF)   (0.054) (0.128) 
Δ TAN Vote Share   -3.539 -5.411 
   (2.966) (3.898) 
Δ Left Vote Share   -8.139 -4.284 
   (5.542) (6.426) 
Payment/Capita    -0.183* 0.058 
(100 CHF)   (0.093) (0.094) 
Previous Merger Attempt 
(B=None) 
    
Merger Attempt Failed   -2.052* -2.123* 
   (1.025) (1.017) 
Merger Attempt    0.262 0.366 
Succeeded   (0.548) (0.616) 
>2 Municipalities   1.312** 0.820 
   (0.410) (0.492) 
Parliament (=1)   0.685 0.161 
   (0.385) (0.546) 
Constant -6.312** -1.957* -1.823* -11.689*** 
 (2.013) (0.836) (0.834) (3.185) 
Canton FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Period FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log. Lik. -208.27 -216.67 -190.66 -169.32 
χ2 32.67 19.56 47.00 69.35 
p>χ2 0.000 0.034 0.000 0.000 
AIC 439 455 415 385 
BIC 486 503 488 483 
Note. *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001. Cell entries are log odds obtained through -logit- command in Stata. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. N Municipalities=541. 
 
 Figure C.1 Size x Self-Determination Interaction: Linear Probability Models  
Note. Predicted probabilities are based on multilevel logistic regression models (4), (5), and (6) 
from Table 3; all other variables are held constant at their mean. 
 
  
Figure C.2 Size x Self-Determination Interaction: Multilevel Logistic Regression Models Note. 
Predicted probabilities are based on multilevel logistic regression models (1), (2), and (3) from 
Table 3; TAN vote share, population fluctuation, and population ratio at 10th, 50th, and 90th 
percentile; all other variables are held constant at their mean. 
